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Discussion of an economic framework for conservative accounting
and Bushman and Piotroski (2006)
Wayne Guay and Robert Verrecchia1
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
April 1, 2006
1. Introduction
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) examine cross-country institutional determinants of
accounting conservatism. In particular, the authors examine variation in accounting conservatism as
a function of the legal/judicial system, securities laws, financial architecture, political economy, and
tax regime. Accounting conservatism, defined by the authors to be the asymmetric recognition of
economic gains and losses into earnings, is a widely documented feature of accounting reports.
Knowledge of the nature and determinants of accounting conservatism is fundamental to
understanding how and why financial reports are used in contracting, valuation, legal, and other
institutional settings. By exploring these issues in a cross-country setting, Bushman and Piotroski
(2006) advance this literature and our understanding of why and how accounting conservatism fits
into the overall financial reporting system.
In this discussion, we focus on three issues. First, hypotheses about why asymmetric
recognition of accounting gains and losses exists and varies across firms or countries do not appear
to be developed from a common and accepted economic framework. Toward this end, in Section 3,
we offer and briefly describe one such framework that we believe is useful in generating economic
predictions about the demand for conservative accounting reports. We define conservatism as: More
timely recognition of losses than gains resulting from asymmetric costs and benefits of reporting
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verifiable information by managers and/or firms with incentives to distort firm performance. A key
takeaway from this framework is that arguments supporting the efficiency of conservative
accounting need not emphasize the merits of timely recognition of losses, as these are obvious.
Instead, arguments must articulate the merits of less timely recognition of gains. In other words,
under an assumption that timely recognition of information is a desirable property of accounting
reports, what are the costs and benefits that make accounting reports more efficient when
recognition of economic gains is delayed relative to the recognition of economic losses?
Second, we discuss Bushman and Piotroski’s interpretation for “Basu-type” regressions of
earnings on stock returns. We express concern, or at least caution, about interpreting the speeds of
“good news recognition” and “incremental bad news recognition” as separate signals about
accounting conservatism. We illustrate how their interpretation of good and bad news recognition is
equivalent to a conservatism measure based on the relative sensitivities of bad news and news in
general. Further, we discuss conditions under which the relative sensitivity is a problematic measure
of conservative accounting systems that facilitate efficient contracting. The intuition for this
inference problem stems from the fact that the relative sensitivity interpretation will tend to
categorize countries with less timely recognition of news in earnings as being more conservative.
Finally, we discuss Bushman and Piotroski’s use of legal, political and financial institutions
as proxies for contracting settings that demand conservative accounting. Little empirical evidence
exists on whether contracts are actually used to a greater or lesser extent in the presence of specific
legal, political and financial institutions. Further, there is limited empirical evidence on whether
specific contracting settings demand more or less conservative accounting. Although Bushman and
Piotroski’s results support predicted relations between institutions and conservatism overall, we
note that their evidence is not conclusive on the validity of these two implicitly assumed links. We
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suggest avenues for future research that directly investigate the links between institutions and
contracts, and between contracts and conservatism.

2. Summary of existing explanations for conservatism
Watts (2003a, p. 211) notes that, “Contracting explains three attributes of accounting
measures: timeliness, verifiability, and asymmetric verifiability.” Watts (2003a, p. 207) also states,
“Conservatism is defined as the differential verifiability required for recognition of profits versus
losses. Its extreme form is the traditional conservatism adage: ‘anticipate no profit, but anticipate all
losses.’”
There has been considerable debate over the merits and determinants of conservatism. Ball
(2001) and Watts (2003a, 2003b) summarize arguments and evidence that support conservatism as
part of an efficient contracting technology. Both authors begin by assuming there exist two types of
accounting information about net asset value and future cash flows: i) easy-to-verify information
and, ii) difficult-to-verify information. Easy-to-verify information might consist of shocks to
operating cash flow, accounts receivable, inventory, accounts payable, etc. In general, easy-toverify information is incorporated into financial statements in a timely manner and there is little
debate that the asymmetric recognition of this information is necessary or desirable.
Discussions about conservatism mostly revolve around the accounting treatment of difficultto-verify information, which might consist of shocks to the value of R&D activities, treatment of
goodwill, restructuring costs related to plant closings, benefits from a brand name, etc. Ball (2001)
and Watts (2003a) consider several characteristics of difficult-to-verify information that drive the
efficient level of asymmetric gain and loss recognition, including: 1) greater costs of incorporating
difficult-to-verify information into financial statements vis-à-vis easy-to-verify information; 2)
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lower reliability of difficult-to-verify information vis-à-vis easy-to-verify information; 3)
asymmetric usefulness of profits and losses to some users of financial statements (e.g.,
bondholders); and 4) managerial incentives to bias financial reports upwards in an attempt to extract
excess compensation.
It is not difficult to see why timely incorporation of information, if it can be collected and
verified cost effectively, would improve the usefulness of financial reports to investors and other
contracting parties. Further, it is not difficult to see how difficult-to-verify information might, in
some cases, be too unreliable or costly to incorporate into financial statements. Therefore, the crux
of the debate about the merits of conservatism should revolve around the question of why,
conditional on the decision to incorporate some difficult-to-verify information into accounting
statements, economic gains are recognized in a less timely manner than economic losses. We
perceive that much of the existing literature on conservatism is focused exclusively on why
information about losses should be incorporated in financial statements in a timely manner, with
little if any, research on why information about gains should be excluded from timely recognition in
financial statements.
Based on our reading of the existing literature, we identify three key characteristics of
conservative accounting:2 1) Compared to accounting reports without conservatism, conservative
accounting reports induce a downward bias in reported net assets; 2) Conservative accounting
reports contain less timely information about gains than about losses; and 3) Conservative
accounting rules impose greater costs on managers who wish to manipulate net assets upward.
Below we articulate what we believe is a more transparent framework for thinking about

2
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conservative financial reports, while preserving the spirit of the arguments summarized by Ball
(2001), Watts (2003a), and others.

3. An economic framework for conservative accounting
3.1 Conservatism as asymmetric costs and benefits of reporting verifiable information
The purpose of this section is twofold. Firstly, we suggest an interpretation of conservatism
that comports well with the extant theory on asymmetric costs and benefits of reporting verifiable
information when managers or firms have incentives to bias or distort results of operations in their
profit reports. Specifically, we interpret a conservative financial reporting system as one that results
from two economic objectives: 1) to make it costly for a manager to deviate from the firm's true,
economic earnings in accounting reports, and 2) to maximize the net benefits of financial reports, in
which reporting verifiable information is costly and some users of financial statements have an
asymmetric demand for information about losses and gains.

Secondly, we point out that

asymmetric conventions are inefficient from an information perspective. Thus, for an asymmetric
convention to be efficient overall, it must more than compensate for the cost of this informational
inefficiency. Further, we note that some contracting-based conservatism hypotheses, such as the
role of conservatism in monitoring managerial compensation, rely heavily on the informational
efficiency of conservative accounting, and as such appeared flawed.
We illustrate our interpretation of conservatism through a simple example. We consider a
one-period model, adapted from Fisher and Verrecchia (2000), in which the manager observes
(true) economic earnings and then reports results of operations with perhaps an element of bias
intended to obfuscate true earnings. To keep the example as transparent as possible, we assume that
economic earnings are comprised of an easily verifiable profit component (e.g., current period cash
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flow) plus a more difficult-to-verify anticipated profit component (e.g., a restructuring charge or
appreciation in the value of an intangible asset). We assume that the easily verifiable component is
positive $50 million (henceforth, m) in all states of the world. We restrict the difficult-to-verify
anticipated component to be negative $30 m in a bad year, $0 in a typical year, and positive $30 m
in a good year. Thus, economic earnings' outcomes are a profit of $20 m in a bad year, a profit of
$50 m in a typical year, and a profit of $80 m in a good year. The ex ante, or unconditional,
probability of each outcome is as follows: a profit of $20 m occurs 25% of the time; a profit of $50
m occurs 50% of the time; and a profit of $80 m occurs 25% of the time. As an aside, the actual
profit figures, and the likelihood of those figures, or, for that matter, a profit versus a loss, are not
important to this illustration; we choose these amounts as a matter of convenience.
Now consider the nature of an equilibrium to a circumstance in which the manager reports
profits to the market. As in Fisher and Verrecchia (2000), we assume that on average the manager
has an incentive to bias reports upward so as to favorably enhance firm share price, and that the
market has rational expectations about the manager's actions. Further, we assume that standard
setters, auditors, regulators, etc., impose personal costs on managers that bias reports. Hence, the
manager trades off benefits of bias as a device to favorably enhance firm share price in the presence
of a market that anticipates and discounts the bias to some degree, against the personal cost to the
manager of biasing reports. These assumptions are generally consistent with Watts’ (2003a) view
that an important role of conservatism is to constrain management’s opportunistic financial
reporting behavior.
In addition, we impose a stylized representation of an asymmetric accounting convention:
losses in the difficult-to-verify anticipated profit component should be reported, but gains can never
be reported. In the latter case, because the manager cannot report difficult-to-verify anticipated
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gains, total profit for our illustrative firm cannot exceed $50 m. Thus, in conjunction with this
asymmetric accounting convention, the manager may only report credibly two profit figures: $20 m,
which occurs 25% of the time, and $50 m, which occurs 75% of the time.3
We illustrate our concept of an economic role for asymmetric accounting conventions by
contrasting two polar cases for the costs borne by the manager when biasing reports. In the first
case, there are no costs associated with the manager biasing reports. Here, the manager reports $50
m 100% of the time. The manager cannot report difficult-to-verify gains, which implies that profit
cannot exceed $50 m. By the same token, if there are no costs associated with biasing reports, the
manager circumvents the recognition of difficult-to-verify losses by deferring recognition until the
losses manifest themselves as a reduction in cash flow (i.e., in the easy-to-verify component of
profits). Thus, in the end the manager reports $50 m exclusively.
It should be clear that when there is no cost to biasing reports and the manager reports $50
m exclusively, the earnings report contains no information. In Figure 1, the line A-0-A’ depicts the
relation between reported earnings and economic earnings (or equivalently, change in price or
returns) for this cost structure. Specifically, the slope coefficient in a regression of reported earnings
and returns is zero in bad, typical, and good years.

Insert Figure 1 here

The purpose of examining this first cost structure is to emphasize that it is not the
asymmetry of conservative accounting conventions, per se, that leads to difficult-to-verify losses
3

As an aside, our characterization of a conservative accounting convention is not intended to suggest that difficult-toverify gains never manifest themselves as income. Difficult-to-verify gains that are unrecognized in a given period will
ultimately show up in future income when the gains become easy to verify profit. The single period nature of our
example, in conjunction with a characterization of a conservative accounting system as one in which difficult-to-verify
gains go unrecognized at the end of the period, is intended to proxy for the untimely recognition of gains.
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being reported, but rather the costs and benefits to the manager associated with his taking certain
actions in conjunction with these conventions (see for example, Ball, Robin and Wu, 2003 for
additional discussion on this issue). In fact, in this extreme case where the manager bears no costs
from biasing earnings, difficult-to-verify losses are never reported in a timely manner, and the
earnings report is no more informative than if the accounting system simply required recognition of
easy-to-verify information. Thus, the existence of conservative accounting conventions may only
be rough proxies for the costs associated with biasing, manipulating, or circumventing difficult-toverify losses. This point highlights the importance of research designs such as Bushman and
Piotroski’s (2006) that explore variation in conservative accounting reports as a function of the
potential costs and benefits to firms and managers from misreporting their financial performance
(e.g., variation in the strength of the judicial system, public enforcement, private enforcement, etc.).
Now consider a second cost structure in which it is prohibitively costly for managers to bias
reports. Here the manager reports $20 m 25% of the time and $50 m 75% of the time. As it is
prohibitively costly to circumvent the recognition of difficult-to-verify losses, the manager reports
them. At the same time, the conservative accounting convention prohibits reporting difficult-toverify gains, and so profit cannot exceed $50 m.
In Figure 1, the line B-0 depicts the relation between reported earnings and returns in a bad
year in this cost structure. Because it is prohibitively costly for the manager to circumvent losses,
the market rationally interprets the manager’s report of a profit of $20 m as a true economic profit
of $20 m with certainty, and prices the firm's activities correspondingly: the market sets the price of
the firm at $20 m. This, in turn, implies that if one were to associate a “bad news” report with the
market price of the firm, the association would be 1 (in an experiment over time or across firms, this
is equivalent to an R2 of 100%). Thus, there is no informational inefficiency for bad news. Because
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earnings are reported truthfully in bad years, there is a one-to-one mapping between reported
earnings and returns, and the slope coefficient is one.
In Figure 1, the line 0-B’ depicts the relation between reported earnings and returns in
typical (i.e., $0 in difficult-to-verify items) and good years ($30 million in difficult-to-verify items).
Because the conservative accounting system prevents difficult-to-verify gains from being
recognized, the manager reports a profit of $50 m in both typical and good years. The market, in
turn, rationally interprets an earnings report of $50 m as true profit of $50 m with probability 50% ÷
(50% + 25%) = ⅔, and a true profit of $80 m with probability 25% ÷ (50% + 25%) = ⅓. Thus, the
market rationally prices the firm's activities at ⅔ x $50 m + ⅓ x $80 m = $60 m. This, in turn,
implies that if one were to associate a “typical news” report of $50 m (which the conservative
accounting convention forces the manager to make irrespective of whether true profits are $50 m or
$80 m) with the $60 m market price of the firm, the association would be 83% (in an experiment
over time or across firms, this is equivalent to an R2 of 83%).
Here, obviously, there is an information loss, or inefficiency, associated with a “typical
news” report compared to a “bad news” report. As a result, there is a less than one-to-one mapping
between reported earnings and returns, and the slope coefficient is less than one (i.e., a dollar of
earnings translates into less than a dollar of returns). The line B-0-B’ depicts the well-known
asymmetry, or “kink,” in the earnings-returns relation that has been widely documented across firms
and countries.
These polar cases of no costs and prohibitive costs on managers who bias earnings reports
illustrate our interpretation of the economic underpinnings of conservatism. When greater
conservatism is interpreted as the imposition of greater costs associated with biasing reports, the
benefit of an economic system gravitating toward a more conservative standard is clear: the
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information content of reports increases, price efficiency increases, and the expected bias in reports
declines.
We caution, however, that although our interpretation of conservatism illustrates the greater
informational efficiency of a reporting system that recognizes difficult-to-verify losses in a timely
manner vis-à-vis a reporting system that suppresses this information, our analysis to this point does
not provide justification for the asymmetric recognition of gains and losses. To see the efficiency of
symmetric recognition of gains and losses, suppose that the asymmetric accounting conventions
described above were abandoned. Specifically, consider an accounting system that requires the
symmetric recognition of both difficult-to-verify losses and gains in conjunction with the
continuation of an environment in which it is prohibitively costly for the manager to bias reports. In
this scenario, the manager reports truthfully in all states: he reports profits of $20 m, $50 m, and $80
m wherever appropriate. Here, there is no informational inefficiency. In Figure 1, the straight line
B-0-B” depicts the relation between reported earnings and returns in this symmetric cost structure.
Because earnings are reported truthfully in bad, typical and good years, there is a one-to-one
mapping between reported earnings and returns, and the slope coefficient is one.
The key point here is that an asymmetric accounting convention that reports bad news in a
timely manner, but good news in an untimely manner, creates informational inefficiencies.4
Empirically, there is substantial evidence that asymmetric accounting conventions are pervasive
around the world, and that they have been so for a long time, suggesting that such conventions have
stood the test of time and serve a valuable purpose (see, for example, Basu, 1997). The key question
is why? Two possibilities come to mind. Firstly, it may be that both difficult-to-verify gains and

4

Holthausen and Watts (2001) note that informational efficiency is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for
accounting reports to be useful or efficient for contracting purposes. We do not argue that informational efficiency is the
primary objective of accounting reports, but rather that the merit of asymmetric informational efficiency in accounting
reports requires articulation of a contracting or other economic explanation.
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losses are valuable from an information perspective, but that difficult-to-verify losses are less costly
to incorporate into earnings (e.g., due to lower data collection costs, auditing costs, or willingness of
management to report truthfully). This explanation, however, seems unlikely. As noted by Leuz
(2001), it is difficult to see why gains are more costly to include in financial reports than losses, and
if anything, it seems likely that managers would be more willing, not less willing, to report good
news in a timely manner (see, for example, Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). The second possibility is
that difficult-to-verify losses and gains are both costly to incorporate into earnings, but that the costs
and benefits of information about losses and gains is asymmetric for certain parties that contract
with the firm over reported earnings (e.g., bondholders, board members, regulators, etc.). We turn
now to a discussion of this potential contracting role of conservatism.

3.2 Contracting efficiencies of asymmetric recognition of gains and losses
A large literature, including Ball (2001) and Watts (2003a), supports the asymmetric
recognition of gains and losses by arguing that certain contracts are optimally written over reported
accounting numbers, and that the efficiency of these contracts is improved by implementing
conservative accounting conventions. Bushman and Piotroski motivate their hypotheses using six
explicit and implicit contracting settings that might influence the demand for accounting
conservatism: 1) debt contracts, 2) litigation costs, 3) political costs to regulators, 4) taxes, 5)
political economy, and 6) managerial compensation contracts.

Our interpretation of these

arguments is that they generally rely on some combination of four assumptions: i) managers can,
and have incentives to, bias accounting reports; ii) it is costly to incorporate difficult-to-verify
information about anticipated cash flows into earnings due to audit costs, compliance costs, etc.; iii)
important users of financial statements, such as debtholders, have an asymmetric demand for timely

12

information about bad news; and iv) contracts are written over reported accounting numbers and it
is costly to write contracts that adjust reported accounting numbers.
We begin our discussion of conservatism hypotheses by addressing what we perceive to be a
common misconception about assumption i) above that managers have incentives to bias accounting
reports. Specifically, we reiterate the points made by researchers such as Basu (1997) and Ball and
Shivakumar (2005), who note that the mere existence of bias in reported accounting numbers is
unlikely to make asymmetric conventions more efficient in many contracting settings. Bias can be
accommodated readily within many contracting settings by simply adjusting the parameters of the
contract. For example, if bondholders have rational expectations about reporting bias, the
parameters of the debt covenants can (and will) be set to obtain the desired probability of technical
default. Similarly, if compensation committees have rational expectations about reporting bias, the
parameters of compensation contracts can be set (e.g., by adjusting the multiplier on reported
earnings) to obtain the desired expected compensation. An example of the latter can be found in
Slezak and Goldman (2005); they demonstrate how efficient compensation contracts can be written
to accommodate managers who bias accounting reports along the lines suggested by Fisher and
Verrecchia (2000). Therefore, to motivate the bias-reducing aspects of conservative accounting
conventions in these settings, one must articulate why contracting over GAAP-imposed biasreducing accounting requirements is more efficient than firm-specific or even setting-specific
contracts that account for expected bias or make conditional adjustments over time. We note,
however, that in some very rigid contracting settings in which it is extremely costly to account or
adjust for expected bias, such as the legal or political arena, reporting bias may induce a demand for
conservative accounting. We discuss this latter possibility in more detail below.
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One of the more straightforward contracting settings that could create a demand for
conservative accounting is debt contracts. Debtholders are an example of an important user of
financial statements who have an asymmetric demand for good and bad news about profitability.
Although debtholders demand information about both gains and losses, the fixed claims of
debtholders are generally more sensitive to bad news about profitability or the value of net assets
than they are to good news.5 For example, holders of debt in a financially healthy firm might find
some important bad news relevant to valuing their claims, but will find good news relatively less
important in valuing their claims. Thus, debtholders have a relatively greater demand for bad news,
and if firms fail to provide such information, debtholders will price protect and impose a higher cost
of capital on the firm. And, under the assumption that difficult-to-verify information about
anticipated profitability is costly to incorporate into financial statements, it may be more efficient
(i.e., less costly) for firms to incorporate more of the difficult-to-verify bad news and less of the
difficult-to-verify good news into financial statements in a timely manner (the difficult-to-verify
good news will be recognized into financial statements when it is realized and becomes easy-toverify good news).
Note that this role of conservatism in debt contracting is distinct from the argument made by
Ball (2001), Bushman and Piotroski (2006) and others that conservatism serves a useful role in
reducing slack in debt covenants. Borrowers and lenders will consider the existing accounting
system and expected level of bias in reported financial reports when setting debt covenants. Further,
as noted by Leuz (2001), it is inefficient to set covenants that trigger too often or too infrequently.

5

The exception to this general rule is when debtholders’ claims are substantially out of the money, in which case the
claims are likely to be more sensitive to good news. However, debtholders with out-of-the-money claims (e.g., firms in
bankruptcy) are likely to have greater access to financial information about the firm than is available through publicly
filed reports.

14

As such, the parameters of the covenants are expected to be set so that slack is neither too little nor
too great, regardless of whether the accounting system is more or less conservative.
The existence of political, litigation, and tax costs are three other commonly posited
arguments to motivate conservative accounting. In the political cost case, it is argued that politicians
(and, in turn, firms) face asymmetric costs associated with incorporating bad news versus good
news into financial reports. For example, politicians may be susceptible to greater pressures from
their constituents when bad news is not incorporated into financial statements than when good news
is not incorporated. Similarly, managers and shareholders may be more vulnerable to lawsuits when
bad news is not incorporated into financial statements than when good news is not incorporated.
Under the assumptions that reported accounting numbers cannot be adjusted easily in political and
legal contractual settings, and difficult-to-verify anticipated profits and losses are costly to
incorporate into financial statements, again, it may be efficient to incorporate difficult-to-verify bad
news into financial statements and ignore difficult-to-verify good news. Further, unlike the debt
contract example described above, it seems plausible that accounting conventions that simply offset
managers’ tendency to bias upward reported accounting numbers could reduce political and
litigation costs (e.g., accounting conventions that reduce net assets by an average of 10% for each
firm). This effect occurs because parties in these contracting settings, such as political
constituencies and court systems, may not readily make adjustments to counteract negative
reporting bias.6
The authors’ tax hypothesis is that tax reporting and financial reporting are linked, and so
firms have an incentive to report conservatively to minimize the present value of their tax burden.

6

For example, imagine two firms, one of which is widely known to systematically underreport earnings by 10% every
period and the other which is widely known to systematically overreport earnings by 10% every period. Although such
underreporting results in no loss of information to sophisticated parties that contract with these firm, one can envision
that a jury might be more likely to find the overreporting firm guilty of misleading investors.
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On one hand, taxing authorities are expected to have rational expectations about this incentive and
can adjust the tax rates and code to take it into consideration (e.g., the Internal Revenue Service
routinely adjusts the tax code to crack down on various shelters). On the other hand, one can
envision the possibility that politicians face pressures to enact high corporate tax rates, but
recognizing that excessive taxes can stifle investment and growth, regulators allow firms to report
downward biased (i.e., conservative) earnings.
Bushman and Piotroski also introduce to the conservative accounting literature an interesting
political economy argument. They suggest governments may be of two types: 1) self-serving, which
attempt to take over profitable businesses to extract value or, 2) benevolent, which intervene when
firms are inefficient and performing poorly. Firms want to avoid government intervention and can
have incentives to either manage net assets and/or earnings upward (i.e., less observed
conservatism) or downward (i.e., more observed conservatism) depending upon the type of
government. However, a potentially confounding issue with the political economy argument is that
governments presumably understand both the incentives that managers have to avoid intervention
and the nature of accounting conventions, and likely will back it out in making intervention
decisions; that is, governments may have rational expectations). Further, governments can also
generally exert influence over accounting policy, and can potentially require accounting
conventions that help convince their constituents that firms are either inefficient or profitable,
depending on the government’s objective.
Finally, an interesting feature of all of the explanations for conservatism thus far is that
managers have incentives to report conservatively even in the absence of conservative accounting
rules. That is, given that both firms and their managers bear costs from paying a higher taxes or cost
of capital, or attracting costly political attention or litigation, mandated conservative accounting
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rules should not be necessary to achieve conservative accounting reports. In other words, when
there is no agency conflict between firms and their managers, the managers have clear incentives to
bias reports upward or downward depending on the direction that minimizes costs to the firm.
Therefore, although these explanations predict variation in observed conservative accounting
reports across political, legal, and tax regimes, they do not necessarily predict variation in the
degree of conservative accounting rules.
The authors’ final contracting setting argues that managerial compensation arrangements are
expected to be more efficient when compensation contracts are written over conservative
accounting numbers. However, this argument seems problematic and does not fit well within the
economic framework we summarized above. To explain this concern, we first note that because
accrual accounting and cash accounting result in the same total earnings over time (subject to clean
surplus and other standard assumptions) preferences over accounting systems for compensation
contracting stem from managerial horizon issues. A large literature documents the existence of both
underinvestment and overinvestment by managers with short horizons. For example, as Ball and
Shivakumar (2005) note, if losses are not recognized in a timely manner in earnings, managers with
short horizons may not discontinue poorly performing projects. There is a flip side however, as
recognized by Leuz (2001) and Watts (2003a), which is clearly conveyed in the following excerpt
from Watts (2003a):
Agency cost-reducing contracts include debt contracts between the firm and holders of the
firm's debt, management compensation contracts, employment contracts, and cost-plus sales
contracts. Contracting parties demand timely measures of performance and net asset values
for compensation and debt contract purposes. Ceteris paribus, managerial performance
measures in compensation contracts, such as earnings, are more effective when they are
timely and reflect the effects of the managers' actions on firm value in the period in which
the actions are taken. Timeliness avoids dysfunctional outcomes associated with managers'
limited tenure with the firm, often referred to as the manager's limited horizon. For example,
a manager may forgo positive net present value projects with near-term negative earnings
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because future earnings will reflect the benefits of the project after the manager has retired
or left the firm (Watts, 2003a, pg. 211).
Thus, if gains are not recognized in a timely manner, managers with short horizons may
forgo investing in positive NPV projects.7 Therefore, if we make the assumption that it is efficient
to write compensation contracts over accounting earnings (as opposed to contracting over stock
returns or other performance measures), it is not clear why or how a compensation contract would
necessarily be more efficient by excluding timely information about economic gains. Further, as
noted above, managers’ incentives to bias reported accounting numbers upward does not provide an
obvious motivation for conservative accounting conventions (e.g., see again, Slezak and Goldman,
2005). Managers have incentives to bias reported accounting numbers upward regardless of whether
or not conservative accounting conventions exist. Therefore, regardless of whether conservative
accounting conventions exist, the firm must set the parameters of a compensation contract such that
the manager is expected to earn his reservation utility. And, as such, conservative accounting
reports alter the optimal weights in the compensation contract but are unlikely to improve the
efficiency of these contracts. As a result, we are unable to endorse managerial compensation
contracts as a candidate driving the demand for conservative accounting.
Our views on how various contracting settings create a demand for three features of
conservative accounting are summarized in Table 1. In the first column, we predict that only the
political costs, litigation, tax and possibly political economy settings are reasonably expected to
7

As an example of a setting where timely gain and loss information might be important, consider a recent study by
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2005), who examine in a global setting the speed with which managers increase or
decrease investment flows in response to improved or deteriorating investment opportunities, respectively. The focus of
the authors’ analysis is whether managers decrease investment flows in response to deteriorating investment
opportunities more quickly when accounting information about losses is more timely. However, the authors’ descriptive
statistics indicate that the speed with which managers increase investment flows in response to improved investment
opportunities varies as much across countries as the speed with which managers decrease investment flows in response
to deteriorating investment opportunities. This comparison suggests that providing incentives for managers to take
positive NPV projects may well be equally as important as providing managers with incentives to shut down negative
NPV projects.
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create demand for a downward bias in earnings or net assets. We predict that increasing the
marginal costs of manipulating difficult-to-verify information about both gains and losses is
expected to lower contracting costs in all settings. Finally, we predict that the asymmetric
recognition of difficult-to-verify losses and gains is potentially cost reducing only in the debt,
litigation and political costs settings. However, note that our predictions do not consider the costs of
implementing and enforcing accounting conventions or policies, and so we can only make
statements about motivations for conservative accounting, not about the optimal level of
conservatism, or truthful reporting in general.

4. Interpretation of “good news sensitivity” and “incremental bad news sensitivity”
In this section, we discuss Bushman and Piotroski’s interpretation of their “Basu-type”
regressions of earnings on stock returns. We illustrate potential inference problems stemming from
an interpretation of conservatism based on the sensitivity of bad news relative to the sensitivity of
news in general. In particular, we discuss conditions under which such an interpretation is unlikely
to be consistent with the economic contracting theories of conservatism described above in Section
3. Our skepticism stems from the fact that the relative sensitivity interpretation will tend to
categorize countries with less timely recognition of news in earnings as being more conservative.
Consistent with a large prior literature, Bushman and Piotroski define conservatism as the
asymmetric recognition of economic gains and losses into earnings. To detect variation in
conservatism across institutional structures, they develop a regression framework initiated by Basu
(1997) and employed for cross-country comparisons by Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) and Ball,
Robin and Wu (2003). The Basu-type regression is illustrated by Bushman and Piotroski in their
Equation (1):
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NI = β0 + β1NEG + β2RET + β3NEG*RET + ε

(1)

In this regression, “NI” is net income, “RET” is stock returns and is the proxy for news, and “NEG”
is a dummy variable that equals one for negative returns and zero otherwise. In the most common
interpretation of this regression, β2 tells us how news, in general, is reflected in NI, where a larger
coefficient indicates that earnings exhibits a greater response for a given amount of news in returns.
β3 tells us whether this mapping is incrementally different for bad news. When β3 > 0, bad news is
reflected in NI more quickly than good news, and accounting is considered to be conservative. We
refer to this interpretation as the “incremental sensitivity” interpretation. Note that although β2 is
sometimes interpreted as “good news” sensitivity, this labeling is misleading because other things
equal, when β2 is smaller, both good news and bad news are less timely. Bushman and Piotroski
follow Ball et al. (2000) and Ball et al. (2003) and explore cross-country differences in
conservatism by testing whether the coefficients β2 and β3 vary with country-specific institutional
characteristics.
In contrast to the incremental sensitivity interpretation described above, Bushman and
Piotroski use an alternative interpretation of conservatism that considers countries to be more
conservative if either β3 is higher or β2 is lower. Although not described explicitly as such by the
authors, this interpretation is similar to a measure of the relative sensitivity of bad news to news in
general as used in Pope and Walker (1999), Givoly and Hayn (2000), and Francis, LaFond, Olsson,
and Schipper (2004). Intuitively, Bushman and Piotroski consider greater values of the following
ratio of bad news sensitivity to general news sensitivity as indicating greater conservatism:
Greater (β3 + β2) / β2 ⇒ Greater conservatism

(2)

Thus, Bushman and Piotroski consider a country to be more conservative either when bad news is
incrementally timelier, i.e., β3 is higher, or when news in general is less timely, i.e., β2 is smaller.
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Bushman and Piotroski do not formally compute or statistically test for differences in this ratio, but
instead look for differences across countries in β2 and differences in β3 as separate signals about the
degree of conservatism.
Our main point in this subsection is to express caution regarding Bushman and Piotroski’s
interpretation of less timely news in general as evidence of greater conservatism. As described in
Section 3 above, conservatism is hypothesized to facilitate contracting efficiency in various settings.
In light of this role for conservatism, a problem with the relative sensitivity interpretation is that
when two countries have accounting systems with similar incremental timeliness of bad news (i.e.,
similar β3), the country with less timely recognition of news in general (i.e., smaller β2) will be
considered more conservative. It seems difficult to argue that, when two countries have similar
incremental timeliness of bad news, the country with less timely recognition of news in general has
an accounting system that facilitates greater contracting efficiency. Stated another way, for a given
amount of incremental timeliness of bad news, the relative sensitivity measure will tend to favor
firms or countries with untimely recognition of news in general as being more conservative and,
therefore, as producing accounting reports that are more efficient for contracting purposes.
As a case in point, consider Bushman and Piotroski’s Table 5 that examines the relation
between conservatism and the strength of securities laws, as measured by strong public and private
enforcement. In every specification tabulated, the incremental sensitivity of earnings to bad news is
not significantly different across countries with different public and private enforcement. Thus, the
incremental sensitivity interpretation of Table 5 is that there is no evidence that public enforcement
or private enforcement is associated with conservative accounting. At the same time, however, the
authors find lower sensitivity of news in general for countries with strong public enforcement. Their
interpretation of this result is that strong public enforcement exhibits greater “relative sensitivity”
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and therefore greater conservatism. However, as noted above, it is difficult to see why, holding
incremental bad news sensitivity constant, contracting efficiency is facilitated by less timely
recognition of news in general in countries with strong public enforcement. Conversely, it is
difficult to see why, holding incremental bad news sensitivity constant, countries with weak public
enforcement have lower contracting efficiency simply because news in general is recognized in a
timelier manner. To the contrary, one might reasonably argue that more timely general news
recognition and equally timely incremental bad news recognition suggests a more, not less, useful
accounting system for contracting.
Although we question the consistency of the relative sensitivity interpretation of
conservatism with the economic hypotheses discussed in Section 3, we note that the incremental
sensitivity interpretation is not without its own problems with respect to drawing inferences about
an accounting system that improves contracting efficiency through conservatism.8 Specifically, the
incremental sensitivity interpretation will conclude that two countries are equally conservative if
they have similar incremental bad news sensitivities, i.e., similar β3, but different general news
sensitivities, i.e., different β2. As with the relative sensitivity interpretation, one can argue that
holding incremental timeliness of bad news constant, a country with more timely news in general
has the accounting system that facilitates more efficient contracting. The incremental sensitivity
interpretation fails to consider this variation in general news sensitivity.
Consistent with our discussion in Section 3 above, a key point with respect to both the
relative and incremental sensitivity interpretations is that timelier recognition of news in general (or
more specifically gains) does not imply an accounting system that is less efficient for contacting

8

Pope and Walker (1999) and Basu (1999) discuss econometric strengths and weaknesses of the incremental and
relative sensitivity interpretations.
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purposes. However, given that both interpretations have inference issues with respect to the role of
timely recognition of gains, we believe that this is an important area for future research.

5. Future research: Testing the links between institutions and accounting-based contracts, and
between accounting-based contracts and conservatism
Our final discussion point addresses avenues for future research on direct links between
institutions and accounting-based contracts, and between accounting-based contracts and
conservatism. The primary tests conducted by Bushman and Piotroski (Tables 4 through 6) are
joint tests of the link between institutions and accounting-based contracts, and the link between
accounting-based contracts and conservatism. Specifically, their research design examines the
following link,
Institutions ⇒ Prevalence of conservatism
as a joint test of the following two links,
Institutions ⇒ Use of accounting-based contracts ⇒ Demand for conservatism
To illustrate these links, consider the hypotheses and tests of a relation between the strength
of the legal/judicial regime and accounting conservatism. The authors describe their predictions as
follows: “If stronger legal/ judicial regimes lead to a more prominent role for the use of accounting
numbers in formal contracts, firms in countries with stronger legal/ judicial regimes may respond to
a higher ‘contracting’ demand for conservative reporting (Bushman and Piotroski, 2006, Section
2.2).” Thus, to motivate the first of the two links, the authors predict that strong legal / judicial
regimes provide an enforcement mechanism that facilitates the use of accounting-based contracts.
Similarly, the authors predict that strong securities laws will lower contracting costs, thereby
increasing the use of accounting numbers in contracts. To motivate the second link, the authors
predict that greater use of accounting numbers in contracts, in turn, creates a demand for verifiable
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and conservative accounting information. In Tables 4 and 5, the authors document evidence
consistent with the predicted positive relation between the strength of both the legal / judicial
regime and securities laws and accounting conservatism.
However, it is interesting to consider whether the two intermediate relations that link the
authors’ joint hypotheses actually hold across countries. To illustrate the importance of these
intermediate links, consider the authors’ predictions that stronger legal / judicial regimes and
securities laws allow a more prominent role for contracts that use accounting numbers. As two
proxies for the prominence of accounting-based contracts in their sample countries, the authors
offer measures of the extent of private debt financing (as a fraction of country equity capitalization)
and ownership concentration in the economy. The authors predict that accounting-based contracts
are more prevalent in high private debt countries and where equity is more widely held. Examining
Table 3 Panel B, we note that these proxies for accounting-based contracts do not always correlate
with the strength of the legal /judicial regime or securities laws as predicted. On one hand, as
predicted, private debt financing is more prevalent in strong judicial regimes (correlation = +0.30).
On the other hand, contrary to predictions, private debt financing is less prevalent in countries with
strong securities laws (correlation = -0.35).
One possible reason for these mixed correlations is that a strong legal / judicial regime might
facilitate both less costly private debt financing and less costly equity financing, making the relation
between the legal / judicial regime and the ratio of debt-to-equity financing difficult to predict.
Another possibility is that the authors’ proxies for the legal / judicial regime or the prevalence of
accounting-based contracts are noisy. For example, widely-held equity and private debt financing
may not be universally associated with greater accounting-based contracts. On the other hand, if
widely-held equity and private debt financing are indeed good proxies for accounting-based
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contracts, then these variables may well be more direct proxies for the strength of the judicial /legal
regime and securities laws than the authors’ proxies for these institutional features. This argument
follows from the expectation that if contracts are widely used by firms and investors in a country,
this is prima facie evidence that an enforcement mechanism exists for these contracts. Given that
links such as these are critical to our understanding of how institutions influence accounting reports,
we believe the literature would benefit from more direct investigation of how institutions influence
the use of accounting-based contracts.
The second link illustrated above, that greater prevalence of accounting-based contracts
implies greater demand for conservatism, is also critical to the authors’ joint hypotheses. In Tables 4
through 6, the authors simply assume this second link exists. However, in Table 7, the authors
examine the interactive effect of proxies for accounting-based contracts on the relation between the
strength of the legal / judicial regime and conservatism. For example, they ask whether countries
with more private debt financing and less concentrated ownership exhibit a stronger relation
between the legal / judicial regime and conservatism. However, if private debt financing and
ownership concentration are good proxies for the use of contracts, then it becomes interesting to
examine the main effect relation between conservatism and both private debt financing and
ownership concentration as a more direct test of the second link described above. These main effect
relations, as reflected by the coefficients β11 and β16 in Table 7, are both interesting and puzzling.
Specifically, it appears that accounting reports are actually somewhat less conservative in countries
with greater private debt financing and less concentrated ownership (although we note the fact that
private debt financing and ownership concentration are correlated makes it difficult to determine
whether this is, in effect, one puzzling finding or two).

25

As one possible explanation for this puzzling finding, consider the fact that accounting
information is used not only for contracting purposes, but also for other purposes, such as equity
valuation. Further, although countries with less concentrated equity ownership might use accounting
information more extensively in contracts, the prevalence of widely-held equity in these countries is
also likely to increase demand for accounting information that is useful for valuation purposes. And,
as described in Section 3, asymmetric accounting systems that constrain the ability of managers to
report information about gains are not expected to be the most efficient for equity valuation. Again,
given the importance of understanding whether and how conservatism is influenced by the demand
for accounting-based contracts, we believe the literature would benefit from a more complete
investigation of the direct link between accounting conservatism and the prevalence of contracts
that employ financial accounting numbers.

6. Concluding remarks
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) provide an interesting and informative examination of crosscountry institutional determinants of accounting conservatism. In this respect, the authors develop
predictions and provide supportive empirical evidence on how accounting conservatism varies with
countries’ legal/judicial system, securities laws, financial architecture, political economy, and tax
regime.
Preparatory to analyzing Bushman and Piotroski, in this discussion we attempt to integrate
the extant literature on conservatism into a common and accepted economic framework. Toward
that goal, we argue that conservatism can be interpreted as more timely recognition of losses than
gains resulting from asymmetric costs and benefits of reporting verifiable information by managers
and/or firms with incentives to distort firm performance. We emphasize that accounting conventions
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that report bad news in a timely manner but good news in an untimely manner creates informational
inefficiencies. Thus, for an asymmetric accounting convention to represent an efficient reporting
system, contracting or other benefits must exist that more than compensate for these informational
inefficiencies. Using this framework, we discuss and critique the contracting settings that have
been offered by Bushman and Piotroski and others to support predictions about variation in
conservatism across countries. In discussing these contracting settings, we stress the importance of
considering both the benefits and costs of asymmetric recognition of gains and losses. We also note
that some commonly accepted contracting explanations (e.g., conservatism’s role in compensation
contracts) appear to rely inappropriately on conservatism improving the informational efficiency of
contracts.
Insofar as Bushman and Piotroski explore variation in conservative accounting reports as a
function of the potential costs and benefits to firms and managers from misreporting their financial
performance, arguably their research design anticipates our perspective.

Nonetheless, in the

implementation of their Basu-type regressions of earnings on returns, we note that Bushman and
Piotroski rely on an interpretation of conservatism that is based on the “relative sensitivity” of bad
news to news in general. We express concern about this interpretation by illustrating how, other
things equal, it is expected to view countries with less timely recognition of news in general as
being more conservative. As our final point, we suggest that the literature on conservatism would
benefit from additional research examining the direct links between institutions and the use of
accounting-based contracts, and between the use of accounting-based contracts and the degree of
conservatism in observed accounting reports.

27

References
Ball, R., 2001. Infrastructure requirements for an economically efficient system of public financial
reporting and disclosure. Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, R. Litan and R.
Herring (eds), Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 127-169.
Ball, R., Kothari, S.P., Robin, A., 2000. The effect of international institutional factors on properties
of accounting earnings. Journal of Accounting & Economics 29, 1-51.
Ball, R., Robin, A., Wu, J., 2003. Incentives vs. standards: Properties of accounting income in four
East Asian Countries. Journal of Accounting & Economics 36, 235-270.
Ball, R., Shivakumar, L., 2005. Earnings quality in U.K. private firms: comparative loss recognition
timeliness. Journal of Accounting & Economics 39, 83-128.
Basu, S., 1997. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Journal of
Accounting & Economics 24, 3-37.
Bushman, R., Piotroski, J., 2006. Financial reporting incentives for conservative accounting: The
influence of legal and political institutions. Journal of Accounting & Economics, (this issue).
Bushman, R., Piotroski, J., Smith, A., 2005. Capital allocation and timely accounting recognition of
economic losses: International evidence. Working paper, University of Chicago.
Fischer, P., Verrecchia, R., 2000. Reporting bias. The Accounting Review 75, 229-245.
Francis, J., LaFond, R., Olsson, P., Schipper, K., 2004. Costs of equity and earnings attributes. The
Accounting Review 79, 967-1010.
Givoly, D., Hayn, C., 2000. The changing time-series properties of earnings, cash flows, and
accruals: Has financial reporting become more conservative?. Journal of Accounting &
Economics 29, 287-320.
Holthausen, R., Watts, R., 2001. The relevance of the value relevance literature for financial
accounting standard setting. Journal of Accounting & Economics 31, 3-75.
Leuz, C., 2001, Comment on infrastructure requirements for an economically efficient system of
public financial reporting and disclosure. Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, R.
Litan and R. Herring (eds), Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 170-177.
Pope, P., Walker, M., 1999. International differences in the timeliness, conservatism, and
classification of earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 37 (Supplement), 53-87.
Slezak, S., Goldman, E., 2005. An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of
income manipulation. Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming.

28

Watts, R., 2003a. Conservatism in accounting part I: Explanations and implications. Accounting
Horizons 17, 207-221.
Watts, R., 2003b. Conservatism in accounting part II: Evidence and Research Opportunities.
Accounting Horizons 17, 287-301.

29

Earnings

B”

B’
A

0

A’
Stock
Returns

B

Fig. 1. Illustration of the relation between reported earnings and stock returns. The line A-0-A’
depicts the relation between reported earnings and returns when there is no cost to managers from
biasing reports. The line B-0-B’ depicts the relation between reported earnings and returns when it
is prohibitively costly for managers to bias reports, but where a conservative accounting system
prevents difficult-to-verify gains from being recognized in earnings. The line B-0-B” depicts the
relation between reported earnings and returns when it is prohibitively costly for managers to bias
reports, but where the accounting system is symmetric and allows difficult to verify gains and losses
to be recognized in earnings.
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Table 1
The relation between contracting costs and three features of conservative accounting

Feature of conservative accounting
Contracting
Setting

Would imposing a downward
bias in earnings or net assets
lower contracting costs?

Would increasing the marginal cost of
manipulating difficult-to-verify gains
and losses lower contracting costs?

Would excluding difficult-to-verify
information about gains lower
contracting costs?

Debt contracts

Unlikely

Likely

Possibly

Political costs

Possibly

Likely

Possibly

Litigation

Possibly

Likely

Possibly

Taxes

Possibly

Likely

Unlikely

Indeterminate

Likely

Unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Unlikely

Political
Economy
Compensation
contracts

31

